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Introduction1 
 
Peter Sloterdijk makes an outlandish claim for a new type of literacy impacting on 
education. Replacing the humanism based on the literacy required to read and write 
letters (one thinks of Cicero and Seneca), he speculates about a new literacy based on 
the reading and writing of genetic codes. Just as societies used the humanism based 
on literacy to separate the literate from the barbarian by means of a “book education”, 
so perhaps contemporary societies now need a new kind of education which promotes 
genetic literacy to “improve” the human lot. In Sloterdijk’s view, where education, as 
an elitist behaviour, once separated the literate from the illiterate, so education in 
advanced societies need to optimize development by promoting gene enhancement. 
Every teacher will by then have become a biotechnologist. This basic thought links in 
with the work of futurologists like Ray Kurzweil and others who claim that a new age 
is about to break upon us (1999). Sloterdijk’s paper, published as Regeln für den 
Menschenpark. Ein antwort zu Heideggers Brief über Humanismus (Rules for the 
Human Park: a response to Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism), was first presented in 
Basel on July 17, 1997 and then at Elmau Castle, the Bavarian Hotel of G7 summits, 
in 1999 and precipitated huge controversy throughout Germany. Did it amount to a 
return to the eugenic arguments of Plato’s Statesman or the eugenics of the holocaust? 
His essay title alone seemed to implicate Heidegger indirectly in the same eugenic 
project, and along with Heidegger, modern educators, who were suddenly roused 
from their dogmatic slumbers by the implications of Sloterdijk’s remarks. Educators 
objected to the “taming” idea but it was Mary Varny Rory, translator of Sloterdijk’s 
piece on the human zoo, who summarised the issue as follows: 
  
If what happens in the mind influences the body, perhaps what happens in the body 
influences the mind; in the absence or failure of a widely read literary canon, 
perhaps we can carry on the humanistic project of reducing barbarism and 
"taming" man's bestial tendencies by breeding for civility? (See 
http://web.stanford.edu/~mvr2j/for_love (accessed 12/02/2016)) 
 
Educators are not used to seeing the humanistic foundations of education linked in 
such a stark way to biological concerns. Nor are they used to identifying education 
with “taming” a wild beast (child). This proposal, however, occurs now at a time of 
great promise in genetic research for the cure of cancers and there seems to be a 
ground swell of support to rewrite the genetic code in certain instances in order to 
reverse the ravages of disease. A new type of genetic literacy makes eugenics 
desirable in certain circumstances such as the proposal to abolish harmful traits, with 
the result that  the old dream (some might call it a nightmare) of a genetically 
modified future generation which boasts better health and more optimal social skills is 
now on the verge of being possible. Where does this put education? This development 
points to the emergence of a posthuman age and would such an age, Sloterdijk asks, 
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not fulfil the educational need to generate the humanism required in future societies? 
Although anthropotechnology seems a remote issue for educators, controversies still 
abound about the many interfaces which children now use in their daily lives to 
connect with information and people. The relevance of Sloterdijk’s dark hypothesis to 
educators is reflected in certain reservations about the interfaces at work in children’s 
lives.  While Papert (1994), Turkle (in her early work)  and Burbules (Burbules and 
Callister Jr, 1996) are generally optimistic about the implications of computer-aided 
learning, others have voiced concerns (See Walters and Kop, 2009). Papert speaks of 
a “megachange” (1994) while Lankshear et al. propose that “the digital age is 
throwing many of our educational practices and emphases …into doubt” (2000, p. 
39). Others agree that there has been a “fundamental transformation in learning 
infrastructure” (Livingstone, 2012, p.20). One of the impacts of this educational 
“revolution” is that many think that information itself no longer has the power to 
civilize and they look for some way to control it in order to make it amenable to the 
learning project.  One feature that is currently popular is the generalised application of 
control measures by means of assessment instruments. These contrary trends, the one 
toward unlimited freedom of access to information, the other a tightening of control 
through frequent testing has led to the paradox that even if one allows for the fact that 
child-centered learning has become the norm,  there is less appetite now for 
Rousseau’s “natural” child  or A.S. Neill’s “adult-free” educational zone in 
neoliberal, performance-directed systems. The hidden coercion of some of these latter 
orientations resonate with Sloterdijk’s view of the need to generate a new humanism 
that will finally end the époque of the “wild” child, who must be “tamed” in order to 
be civilised. Hence the issues raised by Sloterdijk are not quite as alien to the current 
experience of teachers on the ground as it may appear at first glance. Sloterdijk 
primarily challenged the view that putting humans in contact with the great literature 
of the past is an adequate basis for calling such an education humanist. Instead he 
pointed to the fact that evidence of man’s inhumanity to man should reveal to 
everyone that humans are indeterminate in their being and moral attitude. This means 
that quite contrary to the view that man is made in the image of God, to adopt the 
Genesis account, we humans are golems, that is, units of biological mass which have 
no particular telos or end purpose.  
 
This contention might have upset some educators in the audience but more shocks 
were to follow. Sloterdijk went on to contend that human societies should support 
elements of selective breeding that would enhance the human and so it became clear 
to listeners that the augmentation he had carefully traced out in Sphären 1 (Sloterdijk, 
2011/ 1999) was now being brought to bear on the education process itself. To 
listeners, this Star Trek view of the future with its image of a technologically 
advanced world resonated unhelpfully and rather scandalously with Nazi eugenics 
and certainly presented an unhelpful model for education to follow. If Sloterdijk 
thought Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism “opened up a transhumanistic or 
posthumanistic space for thought” (Rules for the Human Zoo, p. 17). I will argue that 
he did so by distorting Heidegger’s already fragile grounds for an ethic of care and 
observation. What particularly upset the German public at Elmau was the way 
Sloterdijk advocated genetic intervention as a form of self-mastery relevant to 
educators. What could have upset educators was his wide-ranging support for human 
enhancement.  
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In response to Sloterdijk’s paper, a whole series of letters and reviews populated the 
pages of Frankfurter Rundshau, Süddeutsche Rundshau and particularly Die Zeit 
where Thomas Assheuer contributed an article with the provocative title “The 
Zarathustra Project” (Die Zeit, September 2, 1999, p. 31). The sequence of this debate 
has been well outlined by Luis Arenas (Arenas, 2003). Sloterdijk rather surprisingly 
responded angrily to these criticisms, suggesting that Habermas was the “éminence 
grise” hiding behind them who rather aggravatingly refused to emerge for face-to-
face debate. The sophistry of his position became exposed even as he challenged 
Habermas to open debate, and, having already called criticisms of his article “lies and 
hallucinations” in the Frankfurter Rundshau of  31 July 1999, and because no real 
face-to-face debate followed, he announced the death of Critical Theory in September 
1999. Habermas responded to the challenge without mentioning names by assembling 
his more considered objections to human germline experimentation in a series of 
articles, later assembled in a book form in 2001 and quickly translated into English 
(Habermas, 2003). 
 
This ethical debate, however, neglected the issue of education per se and avoided 
some of the more telling educational issues. Humanist education is not threatened by 
the context of germline experimentation but by chemical or technical enhancement 
presented as a baseline assumption for education in the future. In other words, the 
issue as to how to understand the human body is now becoming central in the 
philosophy of education. When the body is enhanced for therapeutic reasons, there is 
generally little or no objection but in view of the general slippage from medical to 
non-therapeutic uses in practice, the chemical and mechanical transformation of the 
body is now becoming central to the very idea of education at all. Even on a logical 
level, the slippery slope from one to the other seems indicated (McNamee, 2006). It is 
in this context that the issue of transhuman education, however ill-defined, now arises 
to dislodge our assumptions about human education, natural justice, human rights etc. 
The popular culture appetite now favours transhuman enhancement but ethicists and 
educators are generally resistant. These lines of resistance have been drawn by 
Habermas and others like Jünker-Kenny (Junker-Kenny, 2005) and Edgar (Edgar, 
2009).  
 
Space requires that many aspects of this controversy must be left aside. Instead the 
focus of this paper is to interrogate the issue of humanism for educators in the light of 
the Elmau controversy. It considers in particular Peter Sloterdijk’s 1999 re-evaluation 
of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism and proposes to move in three phases: (i) to 
examine Heidegger’s original letter, marking its key understandings of humanism; (ii) 
to examine Sloterdijk’s paper (as later published) to identify his objections to 
Heidegger’s presentation of humanism; (iii) to draw some implications from this 
debate for education in general and for transhumanist education in particular. 
 
 
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism2 
 
In a letter dated 10 November 1946, Jean Beaufret asked the now disgraced and 
apparent Nazi-sympathiser, Martin Heidegger, for his thoughts on an address made 
the previous year by Jean Paul Sartre and published in French in 1946 with the title 
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L’existentialisme est un humanisme. In that text, Sartre claimed that there is no human 
nature as such, and that humans are not creatures born in the image of God (imago 
dei) but rather beings who must create their own way of being through their action 
(praxis) and choices. Sartre had gone on to argue further that this new state of affairs 
was the new humanism. Heidegger finished his response to Beaufret in December of 
1946 and expanded this piece for a publication in 1947, translated into English as 
Letter on Humanism (See Krell, 2008). The text follows a set of reflections on the 
question Comment redonner un sens au mot ‘Humanisme’? [How can we give 
meaning once again to the word ‘Humanism’] Heidegger emerged from his enforced 
teaching silence to reject Sartre’s position, almost entirely. He agreed on one point 
only, namely, that the human was not to be understood by reference to being in the 
image of God (imago dei). But he particularly rejected the causal link Sartre drew 
upon between action and being, which lay at the heart of Sartre’s position and used it 
as a further example of the forgetfulness of Being. By saying that we are still not 
thinking in the sense that we are not responding to the existential challenge posed by 
thinking, he set out to dismantle Sartre’s assumptions about subjectivity. He rejected 
any strong notion of cogito just as he rejected various forms of interface that risked 
removing Dasein from the challenge of thinking. Heidegger had consistently argued 
for the vulnerability of the human openness to the world and the concealment of this 
openness by various technical devices, such as concepts, ideas and pre-formed 
templates. This pattern, he argued, originated in Plato’s theory of forms which, after 
Descartes, became further complicated by the subject-object distinction. Heidegger 
included in this rejection the written letter form, which may have been historically 
important in Roman times at the very origins of humanitas but which presented an 
interface reliant on the assumption of humans as rational animals, whose interaction 
would be enhanced by literacy. He pointed these remarks at Beaufret, arguing that 
“the questions raised in your letter would have been better answered in direct 
conversation” (Krell, 2008, p. 195).  For Heidegger, to engage as a human, one has to 
confront the experience of being alive and in time. One has to be open (Agamben, 
2004), called forth (Sallis, 1970) to the “worldhood of the world”. Heidegger’s word 
for what I call here the interface is the German word for frame, Gestell, (already 
important for him in his reflections on technology in 1947).  Heidegger’s complaint 
about technology is that it simply re-presents existential experience in “frame” form 
and actually occludes the central character of thinking in human life per se. As he 
writes: 
 
For us ‘world’ does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the 
openness of Being. Man is, and is man, insofar as he is the ek-sisting one. (See 
Krell, 2008, p. 228) 
 
The essential point is that openness is the feature that characterizes the human as 
distinct from the animal in Heidegger’s account and while Sloterdijk will agree in 
general, he will argue that this openness is of a different sort, an openness to that 
which augments the self, and this element whether it is the placenta in the womb or 
the air we breathe is necessarily an element in the material universe which then shares 
the ontical character of a human being (Sloterdijk, 2011/ 1999). For Heidegger, on the 
other hand, humans are not material in this sense. Since language is the house of 
Being (Heidegger in Krell, p. 217),  thinking, like language, cannot be mastered even 
by bright individuals because they are never centered at the executive origin of 
language or thought. Everyone has to grapple with thinking in order to generate even 
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one clear idea. Just as language accompanies the speaker, thinking accompanies the 
thinker and one finds oneself not simply the subjective agent but also the object of 
that which allows the action to occur. Heidegger’s general name for this complex 
space is the human ek-stasis, the condition of humans to be neither entirely here nor 
there but nevertheless somewhere. In this space, Being is not experienced by humans 
as an object standing over there but rather as a type of condition facilitating actions of 
various kinds, including speaking and thinking.  
 
Heidegger, perhaps unfairly, blames the Greeks for the reduction of human action to 
pragmata but it is certainly true that a technological understanding of thinking has 
obliged philosophy to justify its relevance. Philosophy prefers to operate in the broad 
spaces rather than in the reduced spaces allowed by proper scientific method. 
“Thinking is measured by a standard that does not measure up to it” (p. 219) and so 
Heidegger suggests that a general reduction can take hold, turning humans into what 
might be called “thin” beings or “small men”, a point later made by Sloterdijk with 
reference to a quote from Nietzsche (see Rules, p. 21). Instead of such a reduction, 
one might refer to thinking always as the “thinking of Being”, recognizing the double 
genitive and that it is both the subject who thinks and Being which thinks and that this 
double agency is central to understanding the broad texture of thinking. It tames the 
human reality, as it were, and prevents it from seeking to branch out and disregard all 
limits (p. 221). This is summed up in a typical quote: 
 
But if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being he must first 
learn to exist in the nameless. In the same way he must recognize the seductions of 
the public realm as well as the importance of the private (p. 223). 
 
The seductions of the public realm are possibly those images and whispers that 
persuade a human being to believe that they have this or that nature or are limited to 
this or that definition. The sequencing and overloading of public messages to this 
effect can easily seduce the confused human into opting for a “thin” understanding of 
his destiny. To counter this, Heidegger conceives of the human being as contingent, a 
being whose action does not channel exclusively through its own executive function. 
He accepts this fallible geometry as the given and final context for the humanism he 
wishes to explore (a non-centered clearing) against the type of profile advocated by 
Sartre and existentialists in general, which he finds only partly true and generally 
reductive in outline. 
  
The quest for humanitas leads Heidegger to an exploration of Roman and Greek 
culture, linking the concept essentially to paideia or education (p. 224). The human is 
not barbaric thanks to the form of education he has received. Moreover only a fragile 
set of circumstances distinguishes the human from the barbaric. Sloterdijk agrees with 
the contention that letter writing in the Roman world demonstrated to all participants 
the humanitas available. But the meaning of this insight is quite different for 
Sloterdijk who is willing to embrace animalitas as the essence of the human in 
contrast to Heidegger’s claim that “only man is admitted to the destiny of ek-sistence” 
(p. 228). Similarly, Heidegger rejects the Greek model of the animation of a body by 
means of a separable soul on the grounds that it reduces the complexity of the 
“essence” of the human (p. 231). Indeed the human does not live in these narrow 
regions only but in what Heidegger calls a clearing and “the clearing itself is Being” 
(p. 235). 
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The point is that humans do not exercise any thin executive function as they might if 
they were executive agents. The augmented space of their humanitas, their pastoral 
environment as a shepherd of Being (p. 245), means that their destiny is one of 
“care”. Hence they are correspondingly weakened by the prospect of the 
responsibility opened up by “care” compared with beings governed by animalitas. In 
other words, the human comes to know itself as human when it finds itself responsible 
for the environment, responsible for the ongoing maintenance of the world as a 
physical and a social reality and it is this feature that appears under the aspect of 
“care”. If we were to contrast this destiny with what humans actually do, not only in 
warfare, terrorism and general economic exploitation, themes emphasized by 
Sloterdijk, then we would have to conclude that humanitas is not a very dominant 
feature of human behavior. This may well indicate that the human is much more in 
the grip of a lapsed character (Verfallen) than should perhaps be the case and that 
what should be an exception to the humanist rule has often become the norm. 
 
Heidegger’s view of the human as quite different from an imago dei did not lead him 
to abandon an ethical stance for the human. This meant that for Heidegger, humans 
were not made in the image of God but nevertheless operated on the basis of an 
essence described as a state of openness to being, or openness to the world. In this 
openness the essence of man’s own being as a temporal being becomes manifest, as 
time is not something human beings can avoid. Heidegger’s suggestion of 
homelessness submits the structure of ek-sistence to the care of Being (p. 246), a 
responsibility for and to Being. This is not merely speculative concern but is rather an 
ethical commitment to the Being proper to humanitas. In answer to Beaufret’s 
question, Heidegger reiterates that it is the metaphysical meaning of Being (i.e., 
turning Being into an object) that has on the contrary obscured and eclipsed the nature 
of the human (p. 247) and that this position will, on his own admission, make 
Heidegger’s account quite “curious” to many commentators (p. 248). 
 
The Letter on Humanism continues this interesting reflection on ethics, commenting 
on the Heraclitus fragment 119, namely, ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn, a phrase which 
Sloterdijk translates quite differently in a later work ("Man's character is his fate" see 
Sloterdijk, 2013/ 2009, Chapter 3). For Heidegger the ēthos refers to the space or the 
“open region” (p. 256) in which the human can appear, a dwelling place for the 
human. Heidegger qualifies this region in terms of standing in proximity to the gods, 
thus modifying the imago dei concept, but nonetheless retaining reference to the gods 
in human identity. Why did he need to do this? Because he follows Aristotle’s De 
partibus animalium, 1,5, 645a, where Heraclitus is described as linking the gods to 
the activity of warming oneself by the fire: “Here too the gods come to presence” (as 
cited by Heidegger in Krell, p. 259). The appearance of humanitas does not happen 
once and for all as if any individual could fully express human being at any given 
moment but it is rather historically dispersed and may be found in the smallest detail. 
The motif of a journey is suggested, if not mentioned, vulnerable to health or disease 
(p. 260). In contrast, the presumption to speak for Being itself is the greatest 
presumption of all and results in nihilism. In other words to deny the space in which 
the human dwells is to foreshorten human powers and to embrace the totality of Being 
as one’s own, thus situating it entirely in oneself and becoming, as a result, simply 
nothing. Such is Heidegger’s argument. When Sloterdijk, on the other hand, rejects 
the imago dei idea, his objection takes a more Sartrian form, meaning that it is up to 
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humans to make of themselves what they can and therefore that an Enlightenment 
project, as expressed in technological advances, still offers human life some key 
traction points both now and in the future.  
 
 
 
Sloterdijk’s Rules from the Human Zoo3 
 
Before broaching the Letter on Humanism itself, Sloterdijk examines the central 
impact of letter writing on the cultivation of human attitudes and values, a point raised 
initially by Heidegger’s text together with the curious circumstance that led to Jean 
Beaufret’s letter. Like Heidegger, Sloterdijk seems to base his definition of humanism 
on Cicero and the “literary genre” of Roman culture that “recruited adherents by 
writing in an infectious way about love and friendship” (Rules, p. 12), developing a 
genre which, both writers acknowledge, found its origin in the Greeks. Indeed this 
source is so rich that Romans are reduced in this great chain of transmission, 
according to Sloterdijk, to being “decipherers” and “deliverymen” or “interpreters”.  
By linking humanism to the communication of friends by means of reading and 
writing rather than by means of speaking and listening, Sloterdijk agrees with 
Heidegger that the humanism to be rejected is a form of elitism signaled by the 
powers of reading and writing among civilized people.  
 
We learn that the analysis of the golem legend is being closely followed. In Hebrew 
"golem" stands for "shapeless mass". Humanism in its original sense is the attempt to 
shape the shapeless golem or, in other words, to save people from barbarism (p. 15). 
Moreover, Sloterdijk surmises, it is little wonder that after the war, after the release of 
so much “barbarism”, that an acute appetite for humanism would declare itself as its 
antidote. However the illusion of humanism would soon reveal its fragile historical 
roots. Its inability to resist in the face of barbarity would also reveal it as illusory. His 
analysis toys paradoxically with the idea that the human is based on the barbaric 
itself, a materialist picture governed by Hobbes’s idea of a life that is brutish and 
short. The theme of bestialisation and degradation causes Sloterdijk to echo back from 
the second world war to the display of bloody battles offered as entertainment to the 
literati of Rome, pointing to the ease with which the homo inhumanus could 
sometimes reconcile this behavior with  the elitist strategies built up to deny it in the 
company of friends. In this context, “the resistance of the books against the 
amphitheatre” (p. 16) set up a strategy of distance, distant friends writing to one 
another but without any real transformation. What further evidence do we need for the 
superficiality of letters to friends favoured by Cicero’s humanism where the offer to 
calm the savage beast is proposed in the context of battle or, in other words, where the 
tamed can be kept available for warlike purposes: 
 
 But, thereby, it is affirmed that humanity itself consists in choosing to develop 
one’s nature through the media of taming, and to forswear bestialization (p. 16). 
 
A pendulum announces itself and at either end  there is a different node: one swing 
carries the beast back towards civility through taming practices like reading and 
writing; the next swing carries the partly civilized back towards bestiality and the loss 
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of all inhibitions. The twin features of the human then come into view, namely, its 
biological indeterminacy and then its moral ambivalence. Such is Sloterdijk’s view.  
 
So having given Heidegger’s text this particular introductory twist, which effectively 
neuters Heidegger’s argument for care, Sloterdijk finally turns to the Letter on 
Humanism itself. He agrees with Heidegger’s abandonment of any Christian, Marxist 
or existentialist (i.e., Sartrian) reading of humanism and proposes that humanism in its 
post-Cartesian sense adds yet another example to the general forgetfulness of Being. 
Humanism’s denial of Being has become bound up with the density of the human 
nature concept (p. 17), which gestures towards a fixed form of being, a mistake 
further compounded by the basically Aristotelian thought of “rational animal”. 
Sloterdijk correctly explains Heidegger’s distinction between human and animal in 
terms of ontology rather than any Linnaean distinction between species and genius (p. 
18) but he complains about Heidegger’s anti-vitalistic moves to separate the human 
from the animal, especially when the latter proposes a stark distinction between the 
human and the animal. And yet he accurately presents Heidegger’s key thought about 
ek-sistence: 
 
So the point is that in the determination of the humanity of man as ek-sistence what 
is essential is not man but Being—as the dimension of the ecstasis of ek-sistence 
(as quoted p. 18). 
 
While Heidegger is sceptical of any reliance on modern technology to enhance the 
human substrate or to bring into being other accomplishments not possible at the 
moment, Sloterdijk suggests that the problem is one of a difference in degree, rather 
than a difference in kind: 
 
Why should humanism and its general philosophical self-representation be seen as 
the solution for humanity, when the catastrophe of the present clearly shows that it 
is man himself, along with his systems of self-improvement [my italics] and self-
clarification that is the problem? (p. 17) 
 
In place of the imaginary human being as a special being, an exceptional being, in 
view of his reflection of God and thus a demi-god, Sloterdijk, echoing his earlier 
work on cynicism (See Sloterdijk, 1983/1988, p. 26) and his preference for 
materialism prefers to insert the human fully and completely into the animal world. 
This preference effectively reverses the imago dei tradition and situates humans 
“below” the animal in the biologically amorphous state of the golem. From this 
perspective any anthropo-technology designed to raise the human to the status of a 
fuller being is not only permissible but also to be recommended. By refusing to accept 
Heidegger’s main thesis, Sloterdijk supports the clearing of Being idea for other 
purposes, denies the ethics of care explicit in Heidegger’s position, and opts instead 
for a theory of breeding that leads directly to positive eugenics. Indeed Sloterdijk 
complains that Heidegger’s clearing will promote more taming than humanism ever 
did by proposing a default attitude of listening and obedience. Sloterdijk points to the 
fact that this new avocation as shepherd of being is a call to become more inactive, 
more passive, allowing Heidegger to assume the default position of chief 
spokesperson for Being and “the measure and voice of the nameless Ur-author” (p. 
19).  Sloterdijk notes how frequently the taming of many people leads to the raising of 
oneself to a position of central importance. All in all, for Sloterdijk, Heidegger’s 
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shepherding becomes a cryptic statement of fascist power and far removed from the 
open democracy of traditional humanism which it might have signalled to the unwary 
reader: 
 
Humanism cannot contribute anything to this ascetic ideal [a society of knowers] 
as long as it remains fixated on the image of strong men. (p. 19) 
 
But if Heidegger is guilty of crypto-fascism, where does this leave Sloterdijk? Is he an 
opponent of fascism? Not really. There is a definite irony in Sloterdijk’s approach, 
perhaps even a cynicism. Shepherding still has the function of seeking out the like-
minded, “receptive neighbors”, or “groups of silent herdsmen” (p. 19) who arise 
contingently on a day to day basis. More to the point, Sloterdijk asks of Heidegger’s 
space, what is the ecstatic clearing in which the human resides? (p. 20) He recognizes 
that it is the protection of this clearing that forms man’s destiny, for to lose it would 
mean losing humanism itself for the main purpose of this clearing is to conceal “the 
chronic animalian immaturity of man” (p. 20). The nature of a shepherd who is 
safeguard for a safety environment for sheep becomes the metaphor for the individual 
who is both self and safeguard of the tamed environment for humans. This 
Heideggerian space becomes a space of thought (p. 21) by which domesticity, taming 
the manifold and corralling take place through categories of the understanding and 
concepts. It is also a space of decision and choice for what Nietzsche in a lengthy 
passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, quoted by Sloterdijk, calls smaller man. There 
is an ambiguity here in Sloterdijk’s account and for a moment it is not clear whether 
he favours taming or opposes it? Following the Cynics, one might contend that 
domesticity itself has surrendered man to patterns of choice and power that are devoid 
of humanity and thus open to the loss of all initiative. Rather than resolve this issue, 
Sloterdijk calls the domestication issue the “great unthinkable” (p. 23) and yet he 
continually associates domestication with dullness and lack. Sloterdijk calls the 
sciences taming devices for knowledge and in relation to this issue connects “a 
collaboration of ethics and genetics.” (p. 22) “a pet-like accommodation” (p. 23) 
which returns us to an indistinguishable state. 
 
The link between taming and toothlessness continues to manifest itself through 
Sloterdijk’s analysis and there are occasional polemical swipes at Christianity but the 
key emphasis Sloterdijk makes is that there are self-breeders and those who are bred 
by others (p. 23). In a technological age, there will be more active breeders than bred 
and the selection process will become more broadly available and thus require 
regulation by a codex of some kind.  
 
Sloterdijk makes the rather uncontentious claim that bestialization is becoming ever 
more prevalent in the new media. He is equivocal on the question of prenatal selection 
or “genetic reform” (p. 24), which he nevertheless accepts as an inevitable feature of 
our time. It is clear that his preference for self-breeding over passive breeding tips the 
balance in favour of germline modification wherever appropriate even though the 
puzzle remains as to how prenatal breeding could ever be considered self-breeding. If 
I decide the pattern for the genetic make-up of my offspring, how free are they to be 
self-breeders? 
 
The upshot of this analysis does not resolve the tension between taming as an 
ontological attitude and the issue of care which continues to unfold ambiguously in 
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Sloterdijk’s argument for anthropo-technological enhancement. On the one hand, 
enhancement might lead to more elaborate patterns of care through the provision of 
computer-aided comforts and the establishment of biotechnological aids which 
steadily remove biological vulnerability from the rich and well-minded population; on 
the other hand, it might give rise to general release from inhibition in genetic 
experimentation on the grounds that the human species is ready to move on to a 
“higher” form of being. In neither case, however, does Heideggerian “care” appear as 
a central motif. Sloterdijk prefers to reach back instead to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
and the satirical comment about man getting smaller (p. 21). Now coming to the fore 
is Nietzsche’s criticism of “educational institutions” for their role in taming people 
and making them “smaller”. Schools, on this reading, become stifling places, places 
of dullness, places designed to thwart initiative and creativity in order both to “tame 
the savage beast” which may ironically result in the release of the energies of the 
powerful and privileged in the direction of self-taming. It would seem likely therefore 
that education and biotechnological enhancement go hand in hand. 
 
Educational Queries 
The puzzle is that rather than taking up the ethic of care as a way of expressing human 
originality and responsibility for the world and its environment, Sloterdijk describes 
moderns primarily as “profitable breeders” (p. 22) who use as their primary tools a 
lattice texture of educating, reading and taming. Humanistic culture is viewed as a 
kind of taming in a negative sense, where people put themselves in parks, zoos, cities, 
space stations and domestication structures so that the best will emerge as those who 
dominate the flock. As evidence of this new taming spirit, Sloterdijk invokes that 
curious Platonic dialogue, the Statesman, which sets the tone and corroborates, by 
means of the Stranger’s tale, ideas about the plasticity of the human. The Stranger 
speaks about a metabolism’s growth and its reverse in another universe where old 
beings become young again and return to an amorphous mass. This Stranger is 
Sloterdijk’s ally because he argues for a reversible view of human nature, the view 
that power by necessity makes things unequal, and that stability will only follow 
when some superior types (“new, idealized, exemplary individuals” (p. 25)) are 
invented to keep the herd in order:  
 
What Plato puts in the mouth of the Stranger is the program of a humanistic 
society that is embodied in a single full-humanist, the lord of royal shepherding (p. 
26). 
 
Sloterdijk dark view of education may have slipped immediately into equating 
humanism with über-humanism (p. 26) as the full impact of Hobbes begins to take 
hold on his analysis. Not only will scholars of Plato be somewhat miffed at the 
presentation of their Greek thinker as a supporter of mutant realities rather than the 
avowed passifist of the Seventh Letter  but humanists of a more modern sort, 
including Heidegger, would equally be miffed at the Hobbesian assumptions behind 
Sloterdijk’s analysis. Even a statement like “the wise have been left as the only 
worthy shepherds and breeders” (p. 27) is one liable to raise hackles. And it did.  
 
In sum, the Roman humanist discourse with its stress on the emotions and its advice 
on the governance of empire could never be contained within the reinterpreted 
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humanism of Heidegger’s man of letters or the biotechnologically enhanced 
humanism of Sloterdijk’s account. The question of a human dimension has once again 
arisen in the context of machine interfaces and computer-aided learning. It seems 
more plausible to suggest that the absorption of energy, exchanged through dusty 
letters of the past, about which Sloterdijk complains, says more to educators than the 
editing of genes. And yet he could claim that he only wanted to provoke debate and 
that he was not taking up any radical position. But this response seems strangely 
disingenuous since others at the Elmau meeting understood that he supported a 
number of contentious positions: 
 That he favoured enhancement technologies in non-therapeutic circumstances 
and consequently in educational contexts and that he was advocating a kind of 
positive eugenics (to further enhance the healthy). Furthermore it was clear 
that he would argue in favour of genetic enhancement at the germline level. 
This would suggest that Sloterdijk not only supported the transhuman but also 
the posthuman, meaning the experimentation with the human embryo with a 
view to creating new (post)human species. 
 That man was not born in the image of God (i.e., against the Judeo-Christian 
tradition) but was a beast in Hobbes’s sense, only separated from barbarism by 
education and particularly the literacy involved in the communication by letter 
of literate friends and an elitism that could not be denied. This would seem to 
locate Sloterdijk’s philosophy of education in the context of a perpetually 
augmented materialist sphere of human being. 
 That education is generally paradoxical and that teachers are involved in 
taming the wild beast but in doing so it is hard to see how creativity can be 
nurtured in any way other than in the enhancement of the power of the tamer. 
The only creative solution to the taming mechanism is a kind of self-taming 
and this brings Sloterdijk closer to Sartre than to Heidegger. 
 That the humility of Heidegger’s ethic of care is denied as bogus and that 
there is no option outside an ethic of mastery.  
 
Habermas voiced one worrying feature in this debate for education when he noted that 
liberal eugenicists base their arguments on the claim that there is “no particular 
difference between eugenics and education” (Habermas, 2003, p. 49). It is now clear 
that he had Sloterdijk in mind. Many of those attending the Elmau Conference 
interpreted Sloterdijk’s position as support for routine transhuman enhancement. As a 
result, the augmentation value of any education would be less closely linked to static 
models of the human and more closely identified with the medical enhancement 
possibilities of the human species, including improvements in memory, eyesight, 
speed of reaction, application to work, concentration levels and various other abilities 
that are now also subject to genetic experimentation. These are the ways that “royal 
shepherds” will in the future govern the tamed masses. 
 
Considering the possibility of these transhuman effects, Arenas suggests that whoever 
jumps first into positive eugenics will have taken a Promethean step because he will 
have offered to humankind not fire but a whole new way of being human. And if this 
happens, humanist education will give way to many individualized ways of being 
human without any common measure or the moral parameters of a civilized human 
ideal. Why is this state of affairs relevant to education, the reader might ask?  
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First, technology as interface has increased its grip on teaching and learning over the 
past number of decades. Commentators differ, however, on the location of educators 
on this slippery slope, how steep the slope is and where the slope will end. Dahlin 
offers a three-part grid, which it might be helpful to consider (Dahlin, 2012). First 
there is the current incorporation of Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) in the classroom. As evident in resources for teaching and testing, multimedia 
resources that colour classroom interactions are almost universally welcomed 
(although there are some noteworthy exceptions) (For a contrary view, see Bowen, 
2012). These new resources are welcomed by teachers who are hard pressed to keep 
the attention of children well used to the distractions of multi-media devices at home. 
In general one could characterize these new resources in terms of mainstream 
Enlightenment beliefs in human advancement.  
 
In a second step, forms of interface actually change the nature of the interface and 
turn the interface into a separable object in the world. As an example, the simple 
calculator generates a set of knowledge strategies, which learners must master, quite 
independently of their ability to do simple arithmetic calculations. There is also a joke 
about the driver who hit the wrong destination on his GPS and ended up several 
hundred miles away from where he intended to go. The dependency on interface 
devices is a feature of a “transhuman” state of mind, which is probably not an 
advance on our cave man ancestors since it has replaced a sensory relation to the 
environment with a sensory relation to the interface. And yet it continues the 
Enlightenment view that science and technology is inerrantly linked to advances in 
human achievement. The transhuman is therefore indicative of forms of machine-
supported intelligence which have the potential to make humans both more intelligent 
and more stupid. Ethically, there is also a potential for dulling the human sense or 
converting raw, sensory experience into simulation experience. Paul Virilio has 
developed clear reflections on the link between the game-console behaviours of 
fighter pilots operating from a bunker beneath the Nevada desert and the drone 
aircraft they control in Iraq, presenting the very transhuman prospect of “clean 
wars”(See Der Derian, 1998). The preparation of these ethically transhuman mental 
states is already widespread among users of current interface technologies. An 
argument can be made that teachers are unwittingly enhancing the normativity of  
screen-interface relations with the world at large. 
  
A third step, and one considerably further down the slippery slope, is the 
transformation of the human brain and nervous system by means of neurological 
implants, thus transforming humans into cyborgs or cybernetic organisms. This 
moves runs parallel to pharmaceutical alterations in order to improve study 
performance. Various experiments are currently funded (by the American military) to 
achieve this link, as it offers those who have lost the use of limbs to walk fluently 
again. While no one denies the benefit of such a use of a “post-human” technology to 
help the paralysed, it is all too likely that this new technology (when it becomes 
available) will be used by the rich to further enhance the wealthy and the healthy and 
the initial clarity about the benefit of such research will disappear. Current editing of 
the DNA, which has now become more straightforward, will soon modify the human 
genome and this will precipitate a new age of the post-human with unforeseeable 
results.  
 
Whether we find ourselves at step one, two or three of the slippery slope, the role of 
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the human body in learning is now becoming a central issue in the philosophy of 
education. At the core of this central issue is the problem of enhancement. Most 
commentators recognize that the difference between enhancement as therapy and non-
medical enhancement will not survive close scrutiny. Although there may be logical 
reasons for this ambiguity, there are also considerable social pressures to allow and 
even promote an enhanced view of the human species. Apart from exaggerated 
accounts such as that of the Worldwide Transhumanist Association, for instance, 
claims that humans should avail of every possible technological means to enhance 
cognitive or emotional capacity gathers momentum on a weekly basis. Current uses of 
Ritalin in schools is evidence of a general appetite for chemical enhancement among 
the population at large. It only remains to be seen what will happen if parents are able 
to avail of gene editing features to enhance their children’s prospects in competitive 
school environments. Is it not time for philosophers of education to return to an 
examination of the human and to forge new links between what is now appearing as 
the human and education as we know it? 
A final word. The transhuman challenge to education centres on the way gaps prevail 
over continuity. A tolerance for gaps in knowledge, attitude and values, to be filled in 
by relevant technical apparatus, typifies the transhuman challenge to education. This 
tolerance displaces the element lying at the heart of humanitas, not letter writing or 
literacy per se, but rather the phenomenon of memory. Ironically it is by means of 
memory that both animals and humans relate and find a common basis for learning, as 
Aristotle quite rightly noted (Meta 1,1). In our postmodern world, however, it is 
memory that is slowly being dismantled by the technologies that compete to make it 
redundant. It is memory that is being replaced by the vivid imaginings of a brave new 
world. 
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